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  Stakeholder Analysis of the Romanian Energy Sector 
 
  In the process of preparing and implementing a programme as the Reform 
of the Romanian Energy Sector, one need to take into consideration the existence 
of the stakeholders who may have both favourable and unfavourable interests 
(positive and negative interests) in the accomplishment of the respective 
programme. (MacArthur, J. 1997) 
  „The Economy of the Stakeholders” (Analoui, F. 1995) is very important 
for the management of the reform program in the energy sector in Romania, 
because the leadership and the diplomacy are very important for the 
accomplishment of the reform objectives. 
  The stakeholder analysis of the Romanian energy sector (hereinafter called 
„Stakeholders”)  in conection with the core pillars of the reform and with the 
harmonization of its restructuring in accordance with the requests of the european 
directives and of the european energy policy, involves, first of all, the identifying 
and listing of all potential stakeholders linked to this sector, than identifying and 
Abstract 
One of the basic components of the management of a programme of reform is 
the Stakeholder Analysis. It allows understanding and assessing the programme 
environment and provides to the management information defining the negociation 
position in the programme implementation. The paper undertakes a stakeholder 
analysis of the Romanian energy sector in relation with the programme of the reform of 
the energy policy of Romania, as a member state of the European Union. 
Using a matrix diagram, stakeholders are classified in different categories. 
This matrix diagram is the result of evaluation of the interest and of the power of these 
stakeholders over the Programme. In conclusion, both key stakeholders who have 
power and are most interested to develope the Programme and those who are not 
favourable in Programme development but have power and can adversely influence the 
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the appraisal of their interests (overt and hidden) in relation with the sector 
evolution and the fulfilment of the stakeholders matrix diagram, establishing, 
finally, the „key risks” of the decision making process and the viability of the 
applied public policies. 
  The Stakeholder Analysis identifies the interest, the conflicts of interests 
between the different stakeholders, the possible „coalitions”, as well as the manner 
in which the diferent stakeholders must be involved into the programme to 
contribute to its success, based on the identification of the common positive 
interests. (Mitchell, R.; Agle, B.; Wood, D. 1997) 
  Usually, some conflicts are unavoidable, the main challenging problem is 
to manage these conflicts in order to minimize their negative implications over the 
proposed programme.This is why, an important aspect of this analysis is 
represented by identifying those groups having negative interests towards the 
evolution of the Romanian energy sector which, by their influence, can hinder or 
block the programme. A quick and well structured identification of these efects and 
determination of some measures to minimise them, represents another fundamental 
purpose of the stakeholder analysis.( Harris, L. 2009). 
  The stakeholders can be structured in three important categories: 
¾  Key stakeholders – are those who can significantly influence or are 
important to the success of a project or a programme (acording to the 
major policy objectives and to the purpose of the respective 
programme);  
¾  Primary stakeholders – composed by individuals, groups of 
individuals or institutions who are affected either positively   
(beneficiaries) or negatively by a project or a programme who has 
impact on them; in most projects primary stakeholders will be 
categorised according to project objectives and social analysis. 
¾  Secundary stakeholders – are different intermediary entities in the 
process of delivering the activities comprising the project or 
programme, who can or can not take part in the decision-making 
process and who can be influenced positively or negatively also. 
  The Stakeholder Analysis represents a vital instrument of the strategic 
management due to the key role played by stakeholders in fundamenting, 
implementing and finalizing the reform of the Romanian energy sector. (Lambru, 
M. 2006)  
  The Stakeholder Analysis of the Romanian energy sector can be 
undertaken in relation with the programme of the reform of the national energy 
policy of Romania as a member state of the European Union, hereinafter called 
„The Programme”. 
  The Stakeholder Analysis is focused on three main elements: 
a.  The interest of the actors in reaching the objectives of the Programme; 
b.  The power o f  t h e  a c t o r s  ( influence and importance) over the 
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c. The  quantity and type of the resources they can commit to influence 
the results of the Programme and their capacity to mobilize the resources. 
(Schmeer. K.2006). 
  We have taken into consideration only those groups or actors who have 
available resources that can be applied for or against the organization and who 
have interests in the respective programme. They are those having the capacity to 
influence directly the results of the Programme. 
 
1.  The Identification of the Stakeholders  
in the Romanian Energy Sector 
 
  The main Stakeholders identified in the Romanian Energy Sector can be 
structured as follows: 
  a. Key Stakeholders:  
  The European Union, represented by its institutional architecture; 
  The Romanian public authorities (The Romanian Energy Regulatory 
Authority, The Ministry of Economy, The Competition Council, The 
Ministry of Public Finance, etc.); 
  The national companies for energy transmission and network 
(transmission and system operators: Transelectrica, Transgaz, 
Romgaz); 
  The Russian Federation, by its major players in the energy sector (i.e.: 
Gazprom, Rosneft Oil Co,  Lukoil) and in its quality of single source 
of the natural gas necessary to be imported by Romania; 
  International Financial Institutions (i.e.: World Bank, International 
Finance Corporation, International Monetary Fund, European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development, International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, European Investment Bank, etc.); 
  The ruling political parties; 
  Groups of lobby. 
 b.  Primary  Stakeholders: 
  The unprivatised state companies in the system (resources extraction 
companies for coal, oil and natural gas, producers, distribution 
companies, supply companies); 
  The shareholders of the companies privatised with strategic investors 
and portfolio investors; 
  Energy consumers (electricity, natural gas, coal, etc.), private or with 
state capital, legal persons; 
  The energy consumers, natural persons, being in majority captive 
consumers. 
 c.  Secondary  Stakeholders: 
  Potential investors interested to enter or to extend the activity on the 
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  The private Romanian energy suppliers (others than Electrica, ENEL, 
E.ON, GDF-SUEZ or CEZ); 
  Investment projects developpers in the energy sector; 
  Power generation equipment suppliers; 
  The design and research institutes in the energy sector; 
  Banks financing projects in energy sector; 
  Consultancy firms; 
  The employees of the companies in the sector; 
  The trading unions of the companies in the sector; 
  The employers and professional associations in the sector. 
  There must be considered that energy is a strategic sector and, for this 
reason, may be more visible than other sectors, this sector being subject to direct 
political interferes. The political environment has a considerable influence over the 
national energy system reform. 
  At the same time, there are certain groups of lobby, who, at their turn, 
exercise pressure over the public decision-makers, in order to obtain decisions 
according to the interests they represent. In comparison with the political parties, 
the groups of lobby are defined out of the direct interest to participate in the 
conquest of the political power. But this does not mean that they do not influence 
the political power in the sectorial decisions adopted. 
  Within the companies in the sector, there can be identified sub-
stakeholders who, in general, can generate certain conflicts of intrest, between 
them, or in report with the Programme, or simply having different interests. The 
most important of that are the management groups, the employees and the trading 
unions. 
 
  2.  Stakeholders Analysis 
 
  Table 1 shows an evaluation of the interest and of the power of the 
stakeholders of the Romanian Energy Sector in relation with the reform 
Programme of the energy sector of Romania as a member state of the European 
Union. 
 
 A. The European Union by its institutional architecture 
  The interests of the European Union are linked to the accomplishment of 
the objectives established by its new energy strategy. The major objectives of the 
common EU energy strategy are: 
 a.  Security of supply, with a cautious administration and reduction of 
dependency of energy resources from a single source, up to the total independence; 
 b.  Competitiveness, by development of an internal, unique, common, 
liberalized, competitive EU energy market, with a high level of interconnection; 
 c.  Sustainable development, by development of production, transport and 
distribution solutions which ensure environment protection and energy efficiency. Review of International Comparative Management              Volume 10, Issue 5, December 2009 
 
881
  The harmonization of the energy policies of the member states with the EU 
energy policy is implemented by the european directives which are transposed in 
laws or in government decisions adopted at the national level.  
  The interest of the European Union in the Programme is very high, having 
as main objective the completion of the internal EU energy market. The European 
Union can exercise the power by its institutions, by means of different ways, 
among which we mention: the financial resources, oriented to investments for the 
modernization of the energy sector, as well as coercitive measures, as sanctions or 
by the possibility to initiate the procedure of infringement against Romania. 
 
 B. The Romanian public authorities, can have simultaneously, interests 
which can be divergent between them and some of these interests can be contary 
with the EU policies. Thus, the Government has interests in: 
  respecting the EU directives and applying the EU strategic policies; 
  protecting the national economic interests which, sometimes can be in 
contradiction with some comunitary interests; there can be issued national 
regulations which, even if they do not infringe the european directives, they can 
determine some consequences that are contrary or non-congruent with the 
communitary interests;   
  protecting the political interests of the ruling parties, in the sense that:  
y  they promote protective social measures of populist and elective 
essence, but contrary to the normal economical logics;  
y  they sustain some contracting firms or strategic investors that 
finance the respective parties thus finance the members of the 
„political clients”. 
  For example, the national regulatory authorities are subordinated to the 
national institutions, usually to the Government. Theoretically, the regulatory 
authorities must apply the EU policies in the process of regulating the prices on the 
market, of allowing the access of new players on the market, of   regulating the 
competition on the market in the sense that they stimulate the competition or avoid 
the distortions of competition on the market.  
  As they are subordinated to institutions havind political influence, 
undoubtfully these authorities suffer political pressures for sustaining diverse 
interests which, to the great extent are similar to those described at governmental 
interests chapter. Evidently, these pressures can be in contradiction with the 
European practics and policies. 
  By the price regulation, the regulatory authorities can be in conflict of 
interests with the companies operating in the sector, thus generating operative and 
economic difficulties to these, or with the consumers. 
 
 C.  The national companies for energy transmission and network 
(transmission and system operators), have, in general, positive interests for the 
reform, because the programme ensures their consolidation both on the internal and 
on the european energy market, as in Romania they have a statute of monopoly. Volume 10, Issue 5, December 2009              Review of International Comparative Management 
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  Their positioning towards the programme is (in principle) a favourable one 
and the impact of the reform on this group is positive. 
 
 D. The Russian Federation, presents a „negative interest” to the reform 
Programme as the great energy companies from this country can lose an important 
share of the Romanian market. 
  At the same tine, there can be pointed a „positive interest” also, in the 
sense that the privatisation process of the companies in the sector might give the 
Russian companies the opportunity to improve their access to the Romanian energy 
market, by taking over some companies in the Romanian energy sector and thus,  
ensuring the entry of the Russian companies on the European energy market. 
  In other words, the interest in the reform Programme depends on the 
manner this Romanian sector programme of reform will be shaped.  
  In principle, the position of this stakeholder towards the Programme is 
negative and opponent. This positioning was manifested also by obstructions 
induced in the natural gas supply to Romania and by increasing of the price of the 
natural gas supplied to Romania, as long as Russia is the single source for the 
natural gas that Romania has to import. 
 
 E. International Financial Institutions are interested in Programme 
development, because they can finance certain projects that are going to be 
implemented, evidently depending on each organization position and capacity. 
 
 F. The ruling political parties, generally have a positive interest in the 
Programme implementation. But, it must be noted that the political factor is of 
major importance in the strategic management of the reform. These parties will 
promote with priority those reform measures that bring advantages to some client 
firms of the respective party and can delay the measures having real prioritary. 
 
 G. The groups of lobby, exercise their pressure to the political power to 
obtain decisions conforming to their interests, influencing the political power in the 
decisions related to the energy sector. The groups of lobby intensify their activity 
during the election campaign period, trying to determine the election in the 
decision forums of as many as possible persons, ready to protect the interests of the 
respective groups of lobby. In general, the power, their position as well as the 
impact of the reform Programme on these groups of lobby is relatively reduced. 
 
 H. The unprivatised state companies in the system, normally have in their 
structure three distinct sub-stakeholders that may have common or, by contrary, 
divergent interests: 
9  the management; 
9  the employees; 
9  the trading unions. Review of International Comparative Management              Volume 10, Issue 5, December 2009 
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 The  management  in the state owned companies is subordinated to the 
Government and, in general, by that, has the political colour and interests that can 
be oposite to the communitary interests. At the same time, the management of 
these companies may have an ostile or non-cooperative atitude towards 
privatisation, based on their interest to protect the personal interests and privileges, 
as, the most probable, in the case of privatisation with strategic investors, the last 
ones will nominate managers from their own structure, usually expats. 
 The  employees  are usually a powerful sub-stakeholder that can be reluctant 
to the reform or to the privatisation as they are afraid to lose their jobs. Many 
times, the employees are agains the change as they are afraid of future difficulties. 
This is the reason why, the communication with the employees is of extreme 
importance for projects releted with state owned companies. Underlying the 
economical advantages of a project and the way these advantages will reflect on 
them is a success factor. Thus, the energies of some groups of competent 
employees can be oriented, to become sustainers of the Programme.   
  In general, in dealing with this subjects, usually there must be considered 
that between management and employees there are oposite interests, because the 
managers aim to maximize the profit and employees, fighting for their 
improvement of salaries packages, fight, in reality for privileges that lead to 
increasing costs that, at their turn, reduce the profits. It is obvious that it is under 
the competence of the management the possibility that this report to be maintained 
in balance in report with the market and to allow an harmonious cooperation 
without conflicts and tensions. 
 The  trade  unions  can be an important leverage in the state owned 
companies. By definition, the trading unions are  organizations defending the 
afiliated employees in report with the patronate, but there are some examples 
where leaders of the trading unions have entered into occult businesses sustained 
by the management who, by that, gain their cooperation. 
  Participation in different businesses of the leaders of the trading unions or 
directly of the trading unions themselves, leads inevitably to converting the 
activities of the unions from their normal mission.  
  When a certain programme is started, the explicit and the implicit reports 
between these categories of stakeholders in the state owned companies may be vital 
for the programme real success.  
  As a conclusion of the above analysis, there can be shaped the standard 
positions of the three sub-groups form the state owned companies towards the 
programme of reform of the energy sector in Romania: 
¾  the management is against the reform Programme, because they want 
to preserve their privileges, but, at the same time, they have to follow the 
governmental orders;  
¾  the employees can have a favourable attitude if they have expectations 
for progress of their incomes or they can be against the Programme, if they are 
afraid of changes or of losing their jobs; Volume 10, Issue 5, December 2009              Review of International Comparative Management 
 
884
¾  the trading unions are, in general, hostile the reform Programme, 
wheather they are afraid of the consequences over the afiliated employees, or they 
are afraid of losing some privileges of the union leaders. 
  Strictly for the state owned companies in energy sector, it can be 
concluded that, from practical point of view, it can be mentioned that, the 
conclusion of the analysis is given by the resultant of the specific positions adopted 
by the three sub-stakeholders in these companies. 
  In spite the fact that normally, the reform Programme should generate a 
positive result over the respective state owned company, the experience proved 
that, without being a specific declaration, the interest for the reform Programme is 
still low. While the power and the influence of these sub-stakeholders on the 
Programme are very high, the resources are very low if in their background are not 
other sub-groups that ensure the financing, and the sub-stakeholders are against the 
reform Programme.  
 
 I. The shareholders of the companies in the energy system, privatised with 
strategic and/or portfolio investors. 
  The stakeholder analysis of the privatised companies in the energy system 
has many similitudes with that of the state owned companies in relation with the 
structure of the sub-stakeholders, but has a fundamental difference: the 
management nominated by the strategic investors is, in most cases, the defender of 
the company’s interest, overlapping with the normal economical development and 
profitability needs of the company. The companies with a performant management 
sustain the measures of liberalization of the market and of competition growing, 
because this is the only way the companies can develope normally. In exchange, 
the power over the programme is not so high.  
  For this reason, the analysis revealed the fact that these companies show 
interest for the reform, and the reform has, in general, a positive impact on this 
group. 
 
 J. Energy consumers (electricity, natural gas, coal, etc.), private and state 
owned, legal and nominal persons (which in majority are captive consumers) 
represent an important stakeholder that can be protected only by applying the EU 
policies and the reform Programme of the Romanian energy sector. 
  There is the possibility the Government to protect the consumers interests 
by a policy of law prices, having a social implications, but on long term basis, this 
policy of low prices will not be able to sustain the consumers interests, because if 
you block the development of the companies in the energy system by a low prices 
policy, this will imply disastrous effects on long term over the energy companies. 
For this reason, the consumers show a great interest for the Programme of reform. 
  On the other hand, they have a less significant power and influence over 
the Programme. Consumers do not have important resources or high capacity to 
mobilize such resources. Review of International Comparative Management              Volume 10, Issue 5, December 2009 
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  The consumers interests may harmonize with those of the strategic 
investors in case of limiting or diminishing the number of the captive consumers 
and in conditions of moderate regulation.  
 
 K. Potential investors interested to enter or to extend the activity on the 
Romanian energy market, represent a stakeholder who, in general, sustaines the 
reform Programme, as the application of the european policies allows, in fact, their 
extension on new european market segments. Strategic investors are, in principle, a 
stakeholder having common interests with those of the government within the 
european context. But there may be also aspects having national interest character 
in which the strategic investors are on antagonic positions with the government. 
  The interests of the strategic investors may be hindered by the lack of 
colaboration of the management of the privatisable state owned companies and by 
the activity of the regulatory authorities.  
 
 L. The private Romanian energy suppliers (others than Electrica, ENEL, 
E.ON, GDF-SUEZ or CEZ), called  „smart guys” are interested in the market 
liberalization which allowed their business initiation, but they are against entering 
on the market of the competitive strategic investors, who can limit the convectional 
evolution on this market. They can often be identified with the groups of lobby. 
 
 M. Investment projects’ developpers in energy sector are, in general, 
interested in implementing the Programme of reform, because the Programme 
includes projects of investments for the development and modernization of the 
sector. The power of these stakeholder to exercise influence on the Programme is 
sustained by the disponible resources for which they prove to have a great capacity 
of mobilization.  
 
 N. Power generation equipment suppliers, as the developpers of 
investment projects,  represent a stakeholder who is, in general, interested in the 
Programme implementation, because they get new orders and contracts for the 
investment projects (new or rehabilitation and modernization investments). The 
power of these groups to exercize influence over the Programme is also sustained 
by the disponible resources, for which they prove to have a great capacity of 
mobilization.  
 
 O. The design and research institutes in the energy sector, are, in general, 
interested in the Programme implementation, because they get new orders and 
contracts for studies in the research and design projects.  
  Unlike the above stakeholders, in Romania, this stakeholders’ power to 
exercize their influence over the Programme is more sustained by the expertize of 
the professionals than that of the resources, because this group does not have 
special possibilities to mobilize financial resources.  
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 P. Banks financing projects in energy sector have a high interest in the 
implementation of the Programme because they finance the new investments and 
the rehabilitation and modernization projects in the sector. The power of these 
groups to exercise influence over the Programme is sustained by the available 
resources for which they prove to have a great capacity of mobilization. 
 
 Q. Consultancy firms are interested to be implemented the Programme 
because thus they have the possibility to participate in new projects in which to 
provide consultancy services and the power of such stakeholders is quite high. 
 
 R. The employees of the companies in the sector are usually a strong   
sub-stakeholder which is against the restructuring or privatising because they are 
afraid to lose their jobs. Many times, the employees are against the change, because 
they are afraid of future consequences and they want to be maintained the status 
quo. Certainly that these have the power to influence the restructuring Programme. 
That is why, in projects related to state owned companies, communication with the 
employees is vital. 
 
 S. The trading unions of the companies in the sector are, in general, against 
the reforms, either they are afraid of the consequences over the afiliated employees, 
or because they are afraid for losing some privileges and businesses of the union’s 
leaders. They can be an important leverage in the case of the state owned 
companies. By definition, in normal conditions, the trading unions are 
organizations defending the afiliated employees in report with the patronate and in 
implementing any programme of reform. That is the reason why thay mult be 
involved in the Programme for the success of the reform.  
 
T. The patronate and professional associations in the sector, are interested in 
the implementation of the Programme of the reform and they also have the power 
to influence the Programme. Certainly, the financial support is important in the use 
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3. Evaluation of the interest and of the power of the stakeholders of the 
Romanian energy sector in relation with the reform Programme of energy 
sector in Romania, as member state of the European Union 
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  4. Matrix diagram classification of stakeholders 
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5. The Key Risks of decisions and/or the viability of the applied 
policies  
 
¾  The Romanian energy sector needs investments, both new and for 
rehabilitation and modernization. In the context of the international financial crisis, 
the financing institutions will adopt different approaches related to the level of the 
interests perceived and the risk premiums applied for long term agreements for 
loans. Evidently that there will win those financing institutions using small 
interests. Thus, there is the risk for the banks operating in Romania, who practice a 
high level of interest, to lose the competition for financing the investments in the 
Programme for energy sector restructuring in Romania. 
¾  A potential risk is represented by the way the programme of reform will 
be defined, regarding the privatisation projects in which the energy companies 
from the Russian Federation are interested to enter on the Romanian energy 
market. This is the reason why the privatisation projects in energy sector include 
pre-qualification conditions for the potential investors interested to acquire shares 
in the respective companies, that aim for the objective „the common european 
energy market”. Evidently that one of the subjects of pressure is represented by 
taking out these pre-qualification conditions. 
 
  6. Conclusions of the Stakeholders Analysis 
 
  By the Stakeholder Analysis there could be identified those key 
stakeholders who are important for the Programme and must be included in the 
Programme and who have enough power to influence favourable this Programme. 
Thus, the stakeholders listed on the right side of the Matrix Diagram Classification 
of Stakeholders at B and D and who have „high power” are the key stakeholders 
and are the most important for the success of the Programme. These are: The 
European Union, by its institutions; the Government of Romania, by its authorities; 
the national companies for energy transmission and network; International 
Financial Organizations; the political leading parties at power; potential investors 
interested to enter or to extend the activity on the Romanian energy market; banks 
financing projects in energy sector; employers and professional associations in the 
secto;. employees of the companies in the sector; the trade unions of the companies 
in the sector.  These stakeholders interested in the Programme will have to be 
capacitated and drawn in the reform Programme to take part to it. But in fact, all 
the stakeholders of the energy sector reform Programme will have to be implicated 
and, for the success of this Programme, will have to be identified those ways by 
which the stakeholders with a high power and who are not interested in the 
Programme do not hinder it. It results that the trading unions and the employees of 
the companies in the energy sector will have to be drawn in the Programme of 
reform of the sector, to avoid hinder it. 
  On the other side, the stakeholders listed in window A (H.I & L.P.), are 
important for the Programme and there must be found the ways to be increased Review of International Comparative Management              Volume 10, Issue 5, December 2009 
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their interest for the Programme of the reform of the Romanian energy sector. 
These are: The Russian Federation by its major players in the energy sector and in 
its quality of single source of the natural gas necessary to be imported by 
Romania; the groups of lobby; the shareholders of the companies in the energy 
system, privatised with strategic and/or portfolio investors;  energy consumers; 
private Romanian energy suppliers (others than Electrica, ENEL, E.ON, GDF-
SUEZ or CEZ); consultancy firms;  investment projects’ developpers in energy 
sector; power generation equipment suppliers; the design and research institutes in 
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